Contrary to the Islamophobic rant and media, there is no such thing as "Islamic law" insofar as there exists list of rules that are fixed and immutable. Even among issues on which there is ijma'/consensus the classical hanbali and shafi'i jurists reject the notion that the doors of ijtihad are closed. The founder of the Shafi'i madhab himself was a pupil of the Maliki madhab's founder. Al Ghazali was a Shafi'i and practiced ijtihad on matters of ijma' of his own madhab. The hanafi jurists similarly practiced ijtihad to resolve legal issues in the Ottoman era. Ibn Taymiya did the same to his inherited hanbali fiqh, as did ibn Khaldun to the Maliki fiqh. In more recent times, even the most prominent advocate of salafism (return to the pristine origins of Islam), who is none other than Muhammad ibn abd al Wahhab, was a staunch anti-taqleed (imitation of previous scholars), advocating the return to the Quran and hadith rather than relying on a centuries long inherited corpus of laws from medieval times.
The practice of ijtihad never stopped as ignorantly asserted by the orientalists, even in regards to consensus but what the Muslim scholars did was to refrain from founding new schools so as to avoid confusing the masses.
The Quran is not Deuteronomy or Leviticus and their fixed, eternal immutable laws that will be reinstated at the end of times.
The Quran therefore explicitly addresses only a handful of principle issues, leaving the rest to the Prophetic Sunna. These are the transmitted Oral records of the teachings, deeds and sayings, silent permissions or disapprovals of the prophet, as well as various reports of his companions and household. That prophetic sunna itself is largely concerned with matters of worship and the basic foundation of social, human justice. That is why the biggest part of the Sacred Law is the result of a jurist' own independent mental deductions, which is called in Islamic law, ijtihad. If one looks at the compilations of the Traditions, the chapters concerning ritual worship are far longer than those on social transactions.
The reason is that acts of ritual worship are independent of changes throughout time. In contrast, social transactions require explanation according to the changes in circumstances and eras. Binding people with fixed and uniform rules would be harsh and inconvenient. There is thus very little room for analogical reasoning in matters of ritual worship, while in social transactions it operates on a very wide scale. In the Quran too, the commands regarding transactions are mostly framed in general and universal terms. Malik ibn Anas, the author of the Muwatta', rejected a suggestion by the Abbassid caliph Abu Jaafar al-Mansur to enforce his juristic doctrines as the law of the land. The caliph said
“I have decided to copy your book, send one copy of it to each of the regions of the caliphate, and order [the people] to abide by it and not leave it to anything else”. Malik replied “O leader of the faithful, do not do so, for people have already learnt certain views and known certain traditions, and the inhabitants of each region have adhered to one or the other of the different opinions of the Companions of God’s Apostle and others according to which their religious practice has been shaped. Preventing them from that will be hard, so leave people to their practice and to what they have chosen for themselves".
It is to be noted that following the prophet, the successive leaders of the Muslim nation that came after the 4 caliphs (AbuBakr-Umar-Uthman-Ali) progressively carried on political roles rather than religious. This became the field of the ulama'. The result of the aforementioned pragmatism is that very few laws are set in stone, leading to much diversity in legal Muslim opinion. Therefore, a clear distinction should be made between the jurists’ rulings based on Islamic sources and the rulings based on their personal opinions. Muslim jurists have always developed different rulings based on their interpretations and contextualization of the texts compared with the ever changing contexts that have surrounded them.
This is the wisdom of the final revelation, leaving many matters open to interpretation to allow flexibility in matters that may be contingent on circumstances and human experiences as Islam crosses various civilizations, generations, and eras. One of the seven renowned jurists of Madinah, Imam al-Qasim b. Muhammad. Abi Bakr (d.107H) stated,
“The differences amongst the companions of the Prophet Muhammad are a mercy for the servants of God”.
A person once informed the great jurist Imam Ahmad ibn Hanbal (d.241H) that a book had been written called “The Book of Differences”, and he responded that it should instead have been called “The Book of Flexibility”. The prophet himself encouraged this kind of analogical reasoning in social matters. When he was about to send Muadh ibn Jabal to Yemen, he asked
“How will you judge when the occasion of deciding a case arises?” He replied: “I shall judge in accordance with God’s Book.” He asked: “[What will you do] if you do not find any guidance in God’s Book?” He replied: “[I shall act] in accordance with the Sunnah of God’s Apostle”. He asked: “[What will you do] if you do not find any guidance in the Sunnah of the Apostle of God and in God’s Book?” He replied: “I shall do my best to form an opinion and I shall spare no effort.” The Apostle of God then patted him on the chest and said: “Praise be to God, Who has helped the messenger of the Apostle of God to find something which pleases the Apostle of God”.
Many religious commands within the Quran are thus ambiguously framed, as a mercy and leniency. Believers are encouraged to leave them as they are instead of seeking a firm and definite interpretations 5:101-2.
This principle allows jurists to define according to their own time, space and circumstances what constitutes offenses like fasad fil ard. Whatever the conclusion be, it must be in accordance with the principles of morality and wisdom laid down in the Book.
Secular societies have hundreds of changing, evolving laws enacted throughout the centuries by groups holding completely different worldviews. And although the Sharia law, and even the many Mosaic laws, has much less number of laws, life in a secular environment seems freer and more agreeable. This is due to Sharia not seeking to conform to the changing human whims, and their base desires. The secular system on the other hand is permissive in the essential aspects of the individual, including, sexuality, gender interaction or spirituality, which is very appealing.
In the Quran, the central notion in matter of religious responsibilities is that a person's own taqwa, his God-consciousness, should be the primary driving force leading him to instinctively choose the right course of action. This idea is rooted in the pervasive Quranic notion that mankind is ingrained with a spiritual fabric. That spiritual fabric, combined with the spiritual senses of perception 23:78,46:26,67:23,76:2 create an understanding of what is good and bad for the soul. One becomes able to hearken the calls of the self-reproaching soul in place of the evil-inciting conscience whenever a moral crisis arises. It is with that implicit notion that the Quran in many places refers to the commendable deeds with the general term maaruf/recognized,accepted and to the evil deeds as munkar/rejected. Human nature can naturally recognize what is appropriate spiritually, morally, from what should be rejected.
Furthermore, besides the basic responsibilities of national defense, looking after the indigent and ensuring security, the sharia has very little to say about matters of administration. Its silence on the obligatory taxable amount of its Muslim citizen, which is the most basic means by which an administration can function, reflects this notion. It is left to those in governance to work out the details of Zakat depending on the needs of their society and state. This silence also allows for the passage of time where changing conditions and circumstances may require changes in the amount of Zakat levied.
The Quran therefore and neither the prophet elucidate a concept of an Islamic state, but of a just society, and the leader must be the embodiment and guardian of such equity and spiritual uprightness. The verse 2:177 reiterating the issue of direction in prayer comes between verses discussing the laws of religion, it is a warning given to the Muslims that they should not fall into the error into which the previous people fell, who sacrificed the spirit of religion for the outward ceremonial. Internal purity goes in parallel with the external which is why the Quran refers to the Sharia/Law as the Book and the Wisdom 2:151 referring to the body and soul of the sharia respectively, to its commandments and their philosophy. The previous nations, namely the Jews, had neglected this aspect as Jesus amply demonstrates in the NT. The essence of religion, we are here told 2:177, is faith in God and benevolence towards men which Allah compares to an uphill climb 90:11-20 or as Jesus eloquently describes in the NT
Matt7:13-14"Enter through the narrow gate. For wide is the gate and broad is the road that leads to destruction, and many enter through it. But small is the gate and narrow the road that leads to life, and only a few find it".
This important Quranic notion reflects even within its style, abruptly turning from topics of theology and spirituality, to matters of law. For example in sura nisaa, after a long passage dealing with questions on theology, the sura ends with a question on the law of inheritance, thus showing how interwoven moral exhortations and practical legislations are. Among the prophets, one who most emphasized the unbreakable link between social affairs and God-consciousness is Shuayb 11:85-90. Sure Talaq, after detailing certain procedures of divorce ends with a reminder of the unfathomable vastness of the universe as a reflection of God's power. Earth, and all those living on it, as well as sums of money and arrangements between spouses about to separate all suddenly seem small matters in comparison. Obedience to God whose vast kingdom extends beyond this grain of sand on which we live, becomes a priority to the believer, above any worldly considerations.
Because Islam aims at elevating humanity's spiritual awareness, the prophet did not designate a successor, leaving the people to choose based on merit. Given the magnitude of his charismatic leadership and overwhelming reverence, had he chosen one it would have created frictions and jealousies. But by reforming the hearts and minds of the people and giving them the vision of what constitutes a just society, he allowed for the brotherly bond he initiated to fructify after him. Their own conscience should open the way for compromise and consensus, and the selection of the one most suited in terms of spiritual and leadership qualities, who would be able to carry on that vision. In case of failure of that leader, it is considered the duty of every member of that society to uproot the corrupt leader(s).
The Shia on one side see the prophet's household as most justified in being the leaders of the ummah because of their proximity to the prophet and his teachings. They in fact argue that his household is divinely protected in terms of righteousness to allow them to embody the virtues of an islamic society. The Sunnis on the other side believe that the prophet's companions are more warranted in being the leaders, again based on their proximity to the prophet and superior understanding of his teachings. Both groups therefore, even though they differ as to where the leader must come from, agree that this leader must possess outstanding moral virtues.
Besides denouncing tyrants and their practices, the Quran equally condemns those living under tyrannical regimes and that become such obedient servants of the sinful leaders that they become their accomplices in crime, accepting every falsehood and suppressing every protest that is voiced in favor of the truth in order to firmly establish corruption in the land 43:51-4, instead of being upholders of truth and rising against falsehood among eachother and ultimately against the leaders of mischief
90:8-10"Have We not given him two eyes, And a tongue and two lips, And pointed out to him the two conspicuous ways?"
103:2-3"..enjoin on each other truth, and enjoin on each other patience".
Yet we read a completely opposite directive in the HB in in Ecc10:20 that one should never rebel, neither openly or in secret, against this kind of rulers. This idea is the basis by which many rulers, ancient and more recent, especially from the Christian world, found justification for their ruthlessness and corruption.
Moral and spiritual degradation quickly spreads in such a society. That is why to enjoin what is good and to forbid what is evil, has been ordained on the Muslim community as a duty and the community which performs this duty has been declared to be the best community 3:104-10 as opposed to those, such as the Israelites as amply demonstrated in their own scriptures, as well as other nations, who not only did not forbid eachother from sin, but also ended up being assimilated by the polytheists in their midst 5:78-81,7:65 resulting in miseries that affected the community as a whole
8:25"And fear an affliction which may not smite those of you in particular who are unjust; and know that Allah is severe in requiting (evil)".
Such people, despite believing in God, deem it dangerous to do anything against their leaders' dignity, but as for the Creator and Lord of the universe, they do not attribute to Him the same dignity nor are they ashamed in transgressing His limits
4:108,71:13"What is the matter with you that you fear not the greatness of Allah?".
In Islam therefore, each individual has the duty to uphold the moral standards of the community, and the community has the collective responsibility to enforce these standards. Ideally, the moral health of individuals contributes to the moral health of society, while the moral integrity of society encourages and provides fertile ground for the proper moral and spiritual development of each of its members. This principle can be derived from the Quran’s charge to both individuals and the collective community that they enjoin right and forbid wrong 3:104, 110; 9:71.
The Quran relates how obedience to the prophet Muhammad, who was equally a ruler, was restricted to 60:12"what is good" meaning that should even he, a prophet, enjoin something on his followers that seems to be outside the bounds of morality and righteousness then none should obey him.
A major aspect of the prophet Muhammad's leadership is combining authority, power and consultation, with mercy and gentleness. This combination is difficult to achieve, especially when one extends such integrity both to the public and private sphere, as he did. Many verses testify to those qualities of his as of paramount importance in the success of his mission 3:159,9:61,128,21:107,42:38,68:4. Not a single Muslim leader today embodies those leadership qualities as promoted in the Quran through the prophet's example. In fact for one to picture how such leadership qualities are difficult to achieve, one needn't look further than those who were closest to the prophet and succeeded him, who were most fit in repeating his model of leadership, and yet were unable to emulate him in this field. Hence their chaotic rule, resulting in 3 of the first 4 caliphs being murdered following short reigns. Had Abu Bakr's rule extended for more than two years, one can assume he would have known the same fate. After Ali, the situation degraded further. Muslim caliphs did not gain power through the consensus of a majority but by imposing themselves on their Muslim subjects, despite the presence of disruptive and rebellious pockets. Their largely materialistic motives were also far detached from the original vision of the first 4. For example, although the Ottomans expanded the caliphate in all directions yet not a single sultan made the trip to Mecca for pilgrimage.
When one studies Islamic history following the prophet's death, seeing that even the likes of Ali whose integrity was undisputed but had nevertheless to battle internal opponents to the point he was assassinated, then what makes someone like ISIS leader Baghdadi remotely believe he could revive and establish a caliphate?
Neither the Quran nor the prophet promote the notion of an Islamic state. What Islam calls for is the end to religious persecution and all types of injustice. That is why the prophet never named a successor but laid the ground for a just and pious society, which should then naturally choose a righteous leader. If on the other hand the society lacks moral values, it will neither raise at its head a worthy leader, nor uproot a tyrant.
There is thus no basis for the caliphate with an ideology for territorial expansion in either the Quran or in prophetic traditions. These wars did not happen under the prophet's authority. Neither the prophet nor the Quran approve of unprovoked aggression. The life and wars of the prophet testify to this.
"`Abdullah bin `Umar came to us and we hoped that he would narrate to us a good Hadith. But before we asked him, a man got up and said to him, "O Abu `Abdur-Rahman! Narrate to us about the battles during the time of the afflictions, as Allah says:-- 'And fight them until there is no more afflictions (i.e. no more worshipping of others besides Allah).'" (2.193) Ibn `Umar said (to the man), "Do you know what is meant by afflictions? Let your mother bereave you! Muhammad used to fight against the pagans, for a Muslim was put to trial in his religion (The pagans will either kill him or chain him as a captive). His fighting was not like your fighting which is carried on for the sake of ruling".
During the Prophet's lifetime, while the Quran was being revealed, no act of hostility was initiated by him against an enemy because of his religion. For instance, the Jews of Qaynuqa fought alongside Muslim ranks after Badr, a Jewish Rabbi fought and called upon his fellow Jews to fight alongside the Prophet against the Quraysh at Uhud, even many idolaters fought on the Prophet's side at Hunayn and al-Ta’if.
The confusion about the tradition of war in Islam arises from the fact that the decision to join in these wars was given religious justification, because it is the right of every human being to have the freedom to choose his religion, Islam or else. Confusion is also due to the Muslims' enemies being identified by their religious beliefs in relation to Islam; kuffar, mushrikun and ahl al-kitab. There is no compulsion in religion, and until the end of days, ironically the same day which, those who deceptively level these false accusations against the prophet, think that all races and nations will be forcefully bowing to their God Zech14. The notion of divinely sanctioned conquests and subjugation, decimation of foreign population is purely a Judeo-Christian one.
The wars of the first 4 caliphs were the closest to the Quran's ideology of war in that it was actually a war of liberation of the oppressed people of the Roman, Persian and Egyptian nations from centuries of tyranny. There is a reason why the early Islamic state expanded with such speed, the local people did not resist and instead embraced the Muslim liberators that brought positive change in all aspects of their lives, whether they decided to convert or keep their own belief system. For example the Judeo-Christian population of Syria preferred Muslim rule to that of the Christian Byzantine empire. Seeing this phenomenon occurring all throughout the Muslims territories is what made some medieval jurists argue that the Islamic System is a much better one than any man-made law as it opposed oppression. The purpose of waging Islamic war, became in their eyes to spread the sharia, which includes laws accommodating non-Muslim communities. This supremacist view of the Islamic system is what made Ibn Khaldun argue that Islam had to ultimately spread globally, even by coercion.
Throughout time, dominant powers viewed and still do, their societal order as superior, seeking to spread it by all means so as to safeguard their geopolitical interests. It is to be noted that Ibn khaldun maintained that warfare is intrinsic to human history, since immemorial times. He did not argue that cessation of warfare was something unthinkable to Islam. Prior to ibn Khaldun, other Muslim scholars the likes of al-Turtushi described wars as “social anomalies”. Al-Hasan ibn ‛Abd Allah
compared wars “to diseases of society”.
The vast majority of Muslim scholars past and present, view war as a necessary remedy against aggression. Going back to ibn Rushd/Averoes, he reported the controversies of his time as to whether an enemy should be killed because of his hostility or solely for his religious difference and refusal to accept Islam. As one goes through the various legal opinions of the Muslim scholars throughout time and up until the modern era, what transpires is that their understanding of what is required of the Quran and the prophet in terms of warfare reflects the political and ideological environments in which they formulated their ideas. But the historical facts are clear; none of the wars in the times of the prophet and the early caliphs were done against a people solely because of their religious differences. The massive, but progressive conversions, as will be shown later, could by no means be due to the fear of being enslaved by the Arab Muslims during the early Islamic conquests. Otherwise, we should expect many people to have renounced Islam following the military and political decline of Muslim power in the world.
The fulgurant expansion of the Muslim empire and Islam itself as a religion, a mere century following the prophet's death, from modern-day Spain in the west to India in the east, the vast numbers of conquered people that eventually converted to Islam in the process has confounded observers for centuries, more particularly European Christendom. Islam, to these people was an inferior religion. The myth of forced conversions meant avoiding the difficult idea that Islam was the true religion and that God was on the side of the Muslims. The earliest Christian polemics against Islam cleverly twisted the idea. The Muslim invaders were indeed divinely sent, but not for their own righteousness, rather as a rod of punishment against sinful Christians and their leaders. John bar Penkaye writes in the 680s
"We should not think of their advent (of the sons of Hagar) as something ordinary, but as due to divine working:" When these people came, at God's command, and took over as it were both kingdoms ... , God put victory into their hands in such a way that the words written concerning them might be fulfilled, namely: "One man chased a thousand and two men routed ten thousand" (Deut32). How otherwise could naked men riding without armour or shield have been able to win, apart from divine aid, God having called them from the ends of the earth so as to destroy by them "a sinful kingdom" (Amos9) and to bring low through them the proud spirit of the Persians?"
Similarly to other 7th century texts, the Chronicler of Khuzistan says that
"the victory of the sons of Ishmael who subdued and enslaved these two strong empires was from God".
Ironically in the Chronicle of Fredegar, the Muslims are "the sword of God". One overarching theme in those 7th-8th century polemics against Islam is Christian crisis of faith and fear of apostasy. Christians of all spheres of life were rejecting their religion and converting Islam. We read in an apocalypse of the early 8th century
"many people who were members of the church will deny the true faith of the Christians, along with the holy cross and the awesome Mysteries, without being subjected to any compulsion, lashing or blows".
The same is bitterly confirmed by a monk in Mesopotamia, in the Zuqnin Chronicle
"For without blows or torture they slid down in great eagerness toward denial. Forming groups of twenty, thirty and a hundred men, two and three hundred, without any kind of compulsion to this, they went down to Harran to the governors and became Muslims (mhaggnn) So acted numerous people from the regions of Edessa, Harran, Telia, Resh'aina, Dara, Nisibis, Shengar and Callinicum, and from these places both error and the devil gained immeasurable strength among them".
Until now, western scholars and historians are making blunt observations such as "the success of the conquests is virtually beyond plausible historical explanation" (Webb) or "the dynamism of Islam’s expansion defies explanation in ordinary human terms" (Donner) or that we should “dissuade historians from striving vainly to explain the almost inexplicable in normal historical terms” (James Howard-Johnston).
Christians also projected onto this phenomenon their own experience of ruthless conquests, looting, destructions and forced conversion and so Islam became a religion “spread by the sword”. This medieval myth, picked up in the late 19th- early 20th centuries by Orientalist like William Muir, many actually being colonial officials and/or active Christian missionaries that benefited from the vilification of Islam to non-Muslim audiences, is a myth that finds echo in today's Islamophobia industry. Muslim behavior is presented as the latest episode of Islam being spread “by the sword".
Seeing a big part of the Muslim conquests assimilating Christian territories and peoples, this spiritual, political, social, economic defeat resonated hard in the heart of the Christian elites, and still does today. As they tried throughout the centuries to roll back that humiliation through military and spiritual warfare, they only gained success in the former. Christianity, to Muslims, from the scholar to the layman, boiled down to worshiping a human being and God dying, both non appealing alternatives to the instinctive, natural, reasonable message of Islam. As time passed, Christian missionary strategy changed, from comforting the emotionally unstable in the name of the loving God of the Bible, to giving up mentioning Christianity all together; Islam is the religion of the devil and its prophet an anti-christ. If Christians cant have Muslims entering their fold, having them at the very least rejecting Islam is a satisfactory alternative. The reality of the matter however is that even if that strategy is far more successful in making Muslims abandon their religion instead of preaching Christianity directly, the desired results remain poor. The demographics remain from the short to long term heavily in favor of Islam, due firstly to Christianity dying out in the hearts, minds, practices of their societies, but also because the little number of apostates impressed by that demonizing effort, is offset by a radicalizing effect; when insulted to his core, ancestral beliefs, the natural reaction of even the least traditional will be spiritual and intellectual "self-defence", seeking deeper knowledge and strengthening of his religious identity. That missionary tactic is also very unpopular among the Christian public, repulsed by the highly antagonizing rhetoric and painted as the aggressing party. Such Christians very often begin investigating Islam and end up finding it appealing. These factors, and others, pile up. The return on investment for those types of missionaries is negative if one weights the time, money, but especially emotional and spiritual degradation for having to dwell in dark pursuits. The best course of actions to the missionaries of that trend is to work on the betterment of their own souls first and foremost, then to strengthen their own communities' loss of faith in their ancestral beliefs.
As to Muslim interaction with the conquered peoples, there have been of course certain instances in history of Muslims disregarding Islamic teachings and behaving cruelly toward non-Muslims, including cases of forced conversion. Allthough the state and church sanctioned evil throughout Christian history, ie the background of the very people levelling these claims so as to demonize Islam, make these cases pale in comparison. This method of cherry picking incidents and leaping to the broad-sweeping, reductionist conclusion that Islam was “spread by the sword” is intellectually dishonest and doesnt stand the test of scrutiny. Practically, such a phenomenal endeavor would have been impossible to achieve for the Muslim conquerers.
During the early Muslim conquests, Muslims were a small minority in newly-conquered areas, around 10% in Egypt or 20% in Iraq. That is why for at least two centuries the majority of the inhabitants of the Islamic empire were non-Muslims. The regions conquered up to a century after the prophet didnt become majoritarily Muslims until 850-1050. For example although Iran was entirely under Muslim dominion in 705, its Muslim population hadnt reached 50% prior to the mid 9th century, then 75% a century later. One of the reasons for that miserable failure of Islam's "spreading by the sword" was that Muslim rulers actually preferred collecting Jizya which they could use at their discretion, than zakat which, although higher, had to be redistributed locally in the provinces and could only be used in certain ways. To corroborate, the Umayyad general al Hakami was removed from his post because of having prevented the local population of Khurasan from converting to Islam so that he could keep on collecting jizya. There were other such cases such as the Abasside general ibn Kawus who forbade Muslim proselytizing in his jurisdiction.
As stated above there were certainly cases of forced conversions, but these were far more nuanced than the willfully misleading “spread-by-the-sword” narrative makes it seem. The first case mostly picked up by the misleaders is that of south Asia. The notion of millions of Indians forcefully converted is bellied on several levels. Firstly, Islam counted much more adherents in the Indian areas where the Islamic state had less power, than in the heartland of India where Muslim control and dominion was strongest (70-90% in Punjab and Bengal vs 10-15% in the Gangetic Plain). Those who level that charge of forced Indian conversions mostly base their accusations on ambiguous reports from historical sources the likes of “They submitted to Islam” for example. This could refer to Islam the religion, the Muslim state, or the “army of Islam” and a contextual reading usually supports one of the latter two interpretations.
The devshirme system in the Ottoman empire, which consisted in systematically taking young Christian boys, raising them as Muslims then training them to serve in the empire’s bureaucracy or in the sultan’s personal military force, cannot be considered a valid argument for the spread by the sword theory. The system, although obviously condemnable and without any basis in the Quran nor the practices of the prophet, actually many times benefited the religious minorities of the empire from whence these boys were taken, giving them access to high government positions. An example is that of Sokullu Mehmet Pasha, a Slav from Bosnia who rose through the bureaucracy to become the empire’s grand vizier, a position from which he was able to support Bosnia’s Christian community, though he himself remained Muslim.
Another case of forced conversion in Islamic history is that of Yemen's Orphans’ Decree issued by Imam Yahya al-Mutawakkil in the early 20th century. Again, a fringe phenomenon, without any basis in Islam but rather a Zaydi law requiring the forcible conversion of orphaned Jewish children to Islam. However what transpires from history is that, al-Mutawakkil, who was more interested in asserting his authority by adopting his subjects' customs, applied the rule selectively. In many cases he helped Jewish children escape Yemen to avoid conversions. Seeing this, the guardians of many Jewish children actually fled to Imam Yahya’s jurisdiction rather than from it.
In short this islamophobic boogeyman of "spread by the sword" theory has no legs to stand on and the reality of the matter is that theologically, Islam either explained away by the strength of its arguments, or absorbed the other religions and competing theologies about God, consolidating all into one coherent monotheistic worldview.
This was the power of Islam which gave it great intellectual appeal: its ability to satisfy all the existential questions about God and creation, a message of profound substance that remained flexible enough that it would remain forever relevant, and never become obsolete.
As rightly stated by the British historian Hugh Kennedy
"Islam did not spread by the sword but without the sword it would not have spread".
This distinction between the spread of the Muslim empire and the Muslim religion highlights the fact that, as with many new things, whether abstract or concrete, Islam as a religion spread as it engaged with the conquered people. This interaction played out differently throughout the empire, and beyond the empire, including one of, or a combination of factors such as trade, intermarriages, the general appearance of success and prestige of the Muslim conquerors, the appeal of the Islamic social system, local charismatic converts, migrations.
